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activities.
Brian L. Martin
Chlorine Chemistry Council & Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding Environmental
Protection Agency's December 1998 rule adopting a zero maximum
contaminant level goal for chloroform was arbitrary and capricious
and in excess of authority, thus vacating the rule).
The Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA") directs the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") to set standards for the regulation of
certain drinking water contaminants. For each contaminant, EPA sets
a maximum contaminant level goal ("MCLG"), defined as the level at
which no known or anticipated adverse effects on the health of
persons occur and which allows an adequate margin of safety. Once
EPA sets the MCLG, it promulgates an enforceable standard, known as
the maximum contaminant level ("MCL"). The MCL reflects practical
considerations while remaining as close to the MCLG as is feasible.
In 1994, respondent EPA issued a proposed rule setting at zero the
MCLG for chloroform based on an absence of data at the time to
suggest a level below which no potential carcinogenic effects would
occur. In 1998, experts presented scientific evidence demonstrating
exposure to chloroform below some threshold level posed no risk of
cancer. Although EPA accepted this finding, it established the MCLG
for chloroform at zero in its December 1998 final rule.
The Chlorine Chemistry Council and Chemical Manufactures
Association (collectively "Council") petitioned the court to review this
rule and instruct EPA to promulgate a non-zero MCLG using the best
available peer-reviewed science. After briefing but prior to oral
argument, EPA moved for a voluntary remand to consider its Science
Advisory Board's ("SAB") pending report on chloroform. The court
denied the motion. The court explained that since EPA had made no
offer to vacate the rule, EPA's proposal left Council subject to a rule
that they claimed was invalid.
On February 11, 2000, the day of oral argument, EPA released the
SAB's draft report on chloroform. The report stated chloroform does
not act directly on a cell's DNA, and thus low doses of chloroform
involve no carcinogenic effects. After consideration of the draft
report, EPA filed a motion to vacate the zero-level MCLG for
chloroform.
In its motion to vacate, EPA claimed Council lacked standing
because it failed to demonstrate actual injury from the MCLG.
Council contended that a zero MCLG exposed it to greater liability
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act. The court found Council's exposure to higher cleanup costs at least substantially probable with a zero MCLG, as compared
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with a nonzero one. Thus, the court ruled Council had standing.
EPA contended its motion to vacate obviated the need for the
court to issue an opinion. However, the court disagreed explaining
that mere vacatur would not provide an adequate remedy if it found
EPA's action was unlawful.
On the merits, Council argued EPA's decision to adopt a zero
MCLG in the face of scientific evidence establishing that chloroform is
a threshold carcinogen was inconsistent with the SDWA. The SDWA
mandates for an agency action based on science, the agency shall use
best available peer-reviewed science and supporting studies conducted
in accordance with sound and objective scientific practices. Council
asserted that in promulgating a zero MCLG for chloroform, EPA
overrode the "best available" scientific evidence.
EPA provided five arguments in defense of its action. First, it
argued establishing a nonzero MCLG for chloroform would be a
"precedential step" representing a major departure from prior
regulatory decisions related to chloroform. In rejecting this argument,
the court explained a nonzero MCLG simply results from the steadfast
application of the relevant rules.
Second, EPA supported its action on the ground that it could not
complete deliberations with the SAB before the rulemaking deadline.
The court rejected this argument stating that failure to consult with
the SAB is no reason for EPA to reject best available evidence.
Third, EPA justified its decision not to adopt a nonzero MCLG
because it had to reevaluate one of its underlying technical
assumptions. Upon this reevaluation, EPA believed the MCLG would
fall into an interval between 70 and 300 parts per billion. In rejecting
this argument, the court reasoned the uncertainty on this issue may
have provided support for choosing the lowest nonzero MCLG from
within that interval, but found no support for EPA choosing an MCLG
outside the range of uncertainty.
Fourth, EPA asserted its decision to publish an MCLG of zero
pending further review of the scientific evidence was entirely
reasonable since the MCLG has no actual effect on the final MCL.
The court disagreed. Again, the court found no justification for EPA's
disregard of its own scientific findings.
Finally, EPA asserted the zero MCLG merely presented an "interim
risk management decision" pending the final SAB report. The court
presented two reasons for rejecting this argument. First, the court
explained whether EPA adopted the 1998 scientific evidence as its
"ultimate conclusion" was irrelevant to whether those findings
represented the "best available" evidence. The court noted all
scientific conclusions are subject to some doubt. However, Congress
requires EPA to take action based on the best available evidence at the
time of the rulemaking. Second, EPA cannot avoid taking action
simply by dubbing its action "interim."
In the end, the court found EPA's December 1998 final rule
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adopting a zero MCLG for chloroform was arbitrary and capricious
and in excess of statutory authority. Thus, the court vacated the rule.
Additionally, the court planned to issue a separate order for briefing
on additional remedies.
Kris A. Zumalt
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 109 F. Supp.
2d 30 (D.C. 2000) (granting environmental groups' motion for
summary judgment as a result of inadequate Army Corps of Engineers'
analysis of environmental impacts in environmental assessments for
proposed barge-casino projects requiring Clean Water Act and Rivers
and Harbors Act permits).
Based on its analyses documented in separate environmental
assessments ("EAs"), the United States Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps") issued Findings of No Significant Impact ("FONSIs") and
thereafter granted the necessary permits under section 404 of the
Clean Water Act and section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act for
three proposed Mississippi coast casino projects.
Alleging the
inadequacy of each EA, several environmental groups, including
Friends of the Earth, Inc. ("FOE"), successfully challenged the Corps'
determination that each proposed floating-casino project would not
result in significant environmental impacts, and thus, did not require
the preparation of environmental impact statements ("EISs") prior to
issuing the permits.
Specifically, FOE alleged the Corps failed to adequately consider
the relevant direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of the proposed
projects as required under the National Environmental Policy Act.
The court found the Corps' consideration lacking in each respect.
The court outlined the four-step analysis applicable to judicial review
of an agency's decision to forego preparation of an EIS in favor of an
EA. The court must determine whether (1) the agency accurately
identified the appropriate environmental issues; (2) the agency took a
"hard look" at the concern in preparing the EA; (3) if a FONSI is
issued, the agency must be able to make a convincing case for its
finding; and (4) if the agency finds a significant impact, an EIS must
be prepared unless modifications or conditions imposed upon the
project reduce that impact to a minimum.
The court recognized the strong presumption in favor of
upholding decisions of the Corps and the applicable deferential
standard of review. However, the court recognized its duty to make a
thorough, in-depth review of the Corps' decision to ensure the agency
adequately considered all relevant factors and reached a rational
decision. Pointing to the fact that each state and federal agency which
commented on the proposed projects expressed concern about the
potential environmental impacts and suggested that the Corps prepare

